Safe Move = Less Chance of a Win (aka "You play to give yourself a chance!") - Arizona at St. Louis Week Dec 11, 2014

When the Safe Move Makes it Less Likely to Win

On Week 15 of the 2014 NFL Season, the division leading Arizona Cardinals faced off in St. Louis vs. the Rams. In the 4th quarter 6:10 remaining, with the Cardinals' defense playing very well, St. Louis faced a 4th and 1 at the Arizona 1 yard line, down 3-12. Needing a touchdown and a field goal (and assuming no more Arizona points), the "safe" move is to "take the points," and try to get a stop. Taking the points keeps you alive, going for a touchdown and failing effectively means you lose the game as time is running out. But does staying alive actually mean you have a better chance of winning the game?

The Logic

People in favor of taking the Field Goal say "you need to take the points" or "if you fail, you've lost the game. You have to stay in the game to win it!"

The counterargument of going for the touchdown is "You're on the 1 yard line now, it's easier to score a touchdown here and then try for a field goal than it is to kick the field goal now and drive the length of the field for a touchdown!"

Which one is right?

Playing to Win, or Playing for OT? - Rams vs. 49ers, November 2, 2014

In Week 9 of the 2014 NFL season, San Francisco 49ers were losing to the St. Louis Rams 10-13 with just seconds left to go in the game. The 49ers could have taken the "safe" play and kicked a field goal, or taken a more risky play to win the game right away by going for a touchdown. With time running out, most people would have taken the field goal try, gone to overtime, and taken their chances, but what's really the right move here? It turns out it depends, but not necessarily on what you think.

The Factors

The real question to ultimately answer is: Which choice gives the 49ers the best chance to win? Many people say the game isn't played by math, but by players which is of course true. However, if coaches can accurately estimate the chances of success in given situations, it would give them better data with which to make decisions.

Since the game is near the end, we only really have to analyze a few factors: 1) the chance of making the 20 yard field goal try, 2) the chance of making the 3rd and 1 attempt, and 3) the chance of winning the game, if the game goes to overtime.

How not to execute a "go for it"

With 7 minutes in the Sunday Night game on September 28, the Saints were down losing to the Cowboys by 14 points, 17-31. Facing 4th and 9 on their own 40 yard line, prospects were bleak as to win the game (Advanced Football Analytics has it at 2%).

As you might guess, this blog would favor going for it, as you might as well roll the dice and try to give yourself the best chance of winning. Losing by 21 vs. losing by 14 doesn't really matter here. Sean Payton and the Saints trot out the punt team, but they execute a fake punt, putting the ball in the hands of punter Thomas Morestead who, after scrambling to find an open receiver, gets tackled for a 2 yard loss.

Now, while I certainly enjoy watching unpredictable plays and aggressive play calling, this was particularly bad. There were several factors making this a bad play.

1) The offense was down by 14 points late in the game, meaning the defense would be wise to look for trickery in a desperate situation.
2) The primary ball carrier isn't used to handling the ball in this way.
3) The players on the field are not regular starters, in order to not tip off the play.

All in all, just a bad idea. Either punting and hoping for a stop or going for it with a regular offense would have been better. Alternatively, a run might have worked too. It surely would have gotten better results than a 2 yard loss. In fact, the punter should have just thrown the ball away in that spot rather than take the 2 yard loss, not that it matters much.

Ultimately, who do you want throwing the ball here?

Drew Brees career passing stats:
4,564 completions, 6,916 attempts (66%)
51,944 yards (7.5 yards per attempt)
368 TD passes

Thomas Morestead career passing stats:
0 completions, 0 attempts, 0 TD passes

Easiest Promotion Ever? Pick the Championship Game Winners and win $5000+ - Independent Probabilities

During the Conference Championship weekend for 2014, Gallery Furniture, a Houston based furniture store offered up refunds to customers who a) correctly picked the winners of both the AFC and NFC championship games, and b) bought more than $5000 worth of furniture.  As shown from the video below, the promotion worked either great, or horrible, depending on your point of view.

When companies run promotions like this which have the possibility to return a lot of money to people, they usually do some sort of statistical analysis to see what the odds of winning actually are.  If they're not comfortable with that sort of risk, companies will frequently insure their promotions so they won't bear the full risk.  The insurance company calculates the odds of success, bills the company making the promotion, then pays out the winnings if the contestant hits.  

That leads us to two questions.  The first is relatively easy to answer: What are the chances of each combination of winners in the Championship games?  The second is more difficult: What will people be betting on?

The games themselves were very well matched.  The Broncos and Seahawks were a combined 26-6 in the regular season, while the Patriots and the 49ers were "only" 24-8.   Though their seeding didn't really reflect it, this was really a matchup of the two best teams in each conference.  So, how did Gallery Furniture lose so much money?

Fortune Favors the Bold - Seattle vs. San Francisco - NFC Championship Game January 19, 2014

The Seattle Seahawks are going to Super Bowl XLVIII on the strength of a 23-17 victory over the visiting San Francisco 49ers.  The big play was the 4th and 7 touchdown pass from Russell Wilson to Jermaine Kearse from the 49ers 35 yard line.  Fortune favors the bold, and while some coaches might have opted to take the 53 yard field goal attempt or a punt to pin the 49ers deep in their own territory with plenty of time to get the ball back.  Coach Pete Carroll opted to go for it, and was rewarded.

Seahawks Jermaine Kearse catches this 35 yard TD pass from QB Russell Wilson

Though the decision paid off, we want to look at the mathematics behind the decision to figure out if it was a correct one or not.  Which option was the best in this situation?

The Situation and Options

At the start of the 4th quarter (13:52 remaining), the Seahawks trail 13-17.  The ball is at the 49ers 35 yard line and it's now 4th and 7.  The three options here are all seemingly reasonable:

1. Punting
2. Attempting a Field Goal
3. Going for it

In order to figure out which option is the best, we'll have to make some assumptions and use the Win Probability calculator from Advanced NFL Stats, to break down the expected outcome of each situation.

When 7 is not Greater than 2 - Dan Dierdorf - Indianapolis at New England, January 11, 2014

Dan Dierdorf is a football guy.  He played 13 seasons in the NFL, all for the St. Louis Cardinals.  He played all the positions on the offensive line, made the Pro Bowl 6 times and was enshrined in the Pro Football Hall of Fame in 1996.  Heck, he was even born in Canton, Ohio.  (For those of you unaware, it's the location of the Football Hall of Fame).  So it was especially puzzling to many football fans when Dierdorf basically said during last Saturday's Colts/Patriots game, that giving up 2 points is not as good as giving up 7 points or 3 points.

The Situation

On 4th down at their own 44 yard line, the Patriots line up to punt.  The snap sails over punter Ryan Allen's head, all the way back to the 2 yard line.  Allen eventually fumbles but the ball is batted out of the end zone for a safety, one of the more bizarre plays in the game.

Dierdorf, as the CBS color commentator (broadcasting his final game), suggested that it would have been better if Allen covered up the ball at the 2 yard line, preventing the Colts from scoring a safety that play.  Various pundits covering and watching the game blew up at that comment, saying it was one of the worst commentary they had ever heard.

The Two Worst Kicking Plays of the Playoffs - Indianapolis at New England - January 11, 2014

These were by far the two worst kicking decisions in the playoffs so far.  I'm not going to even do the math on these, but let's see how absurd these decisions are.  One decision was made while desperately behind, the other while comfortably ahead, and while neither determined the outcome of the game, they were both completely absurd.

The Game

The Indianapolis Colts faced the New England Patriots in the AFC Divisional round of the 2014 playoffs.  Due to the some early miscues, the Colts find themselves down in the game early, though only down 21-12 at halftime.  However, it's the 4th quarter decisions that leave me shaking my head.

Giving Up on the Season - Chuck Pagano

In the 4th quarter, the Colts are now down by 3 touchdowns, 22-43, and have the ball on their own 29 yard line with a 4th down and 1 (though it was probably less than 1 yard).  There is 10:30 left in the game.  The Patriots have been running the ball down your throat all game and will do so if they get the ball in an attempt to run out the clock. 

This is an obvious go-for-it situation here if you want to win a playoff game.  Instead, out comes the punt team.  It doesn't matter that field position is bad for the Colts, they're down by 3 touchdowns and desperate.  The Patriots would go on to take 8 more minutes off the clock, and the Colts would only have 1 more possession to close out the game.

When a team is that desperate in a playoff game and you send out the kicking unit, that qualifies as one of the worst kicking decisions in the playoffs, never mind the outcome.

Punting for 6 Yards - Bill Belichick

Later in the same quarter, the Patriots are running the clock down to under 3 minutes when they face a 4th and 10 at the Colts 26 yard line.  A field goal try would be around 44 yards here, a makable distance for kicker Stephen Gostowski.  Going for it would not be easy, but would give the Patriots a chance, however a slim one, to maintain the ball.  Plus, up 3 touchdowns, field position matters less.

Out comes the punt team, and Gostowski punts it into the end zone for a touchback.  Net gain in field position of 6 yards.  Since the Patriots go on to win this handily, nothing Belichick could do here would run their chances of victory, but it just leaves you scratching your head sometimes.

Hidden Plays - First Quarter Plays Set the Stage - Kansas City at Indianapolis, January 4th, 2013

2014 Wild Card Weekend was one for the ages.  Three games decided by a field goal, and the other one close enough to be in doubt until late (though there were plenty of questionable decisions by the losing coach).

The Chiefs/Colts game was crazy, with 89 points scored between the two teams and a 4 touchdown comeback (the 2nd greatest comeback in NFL playoff history, only to this '93 game between the Oilers and the Bills).  The Colt's 45-44 victory will be remembered for a long time in Indianapolis and around the league.

With the game being decided by a single point, one might think the game's most important decisions were made in the 2nd half as Indianapolis made their comeback.  Indeed, it was quite a monumental collapse by Kansas City.  Advanced NFL Stats even looked into the Chiefs' chance of winning if they simply knelt down on every play in the 2nd half.  However, there was a play early in the game that could have helped Kansas City get to an even further lead.

The Situation

With the game tied at 7, Kansas City faced a 4th-and-1 at the Colts' 1 yard line.  They got to this point from an Alex Smith to Dwayne Bowe 63 yard hookup, but only managed 1 yard on the first 3 downs.  Out comes the field goal unit and Ryan Succop kicks a 19 yard field goal to go up by 3.  Was it the right move?  Was it in fact the "safe" play here?

The Factors

Once again, we will look at the probabilities of success and failure for both a 4th down attempt and a field goal, but also look at what the expected outcome of the next Colts possession would be.  To do so, we will break it down into several parts:

1. Chiefs Kick a Field Goal

     a. What is the probability of success or failure?

     b. What is the expected outcome of the Colts' next drive depending on success or failure?

2. Chiefs Go for It on 4th Down

     a. What is the probability of success or failure?

     b. What is the expected outcome of the Colts' next drive depending on success or failure?

Since the game is still in the first half, the clock makes much less of a difference.  Clearly, if it was a tie game with only 2 seconds left to go, the Chief's would maximize win probability instead of trying to score the most points.

The Fine Line Between Genius and Insanity, Eric Weddle - San Diego vs. Kansas City, December 29, 2013

In week 17 of the 2013 season, the San Diego Chargers needed a win (or a tie) against the Kansas City Chiefs to advance to the playoffs.  KC kicker Ryan Succop missed a field goal attempt at the end of regulation to give the Chargers a chance to win it in overtime.  The most memorable play from that overtime period was when Charger safety Eric Weddle, as the personal protector on the punt team, took the snap from punt formation and rushed to gain a first down.  The Chargers go on to kick a field goal on this drive and hold on to win.


This was one of the most gutsy moves of the season, one that wasn't called by head coach Mike McCoy or special teams coach Kevin Spencer, but it was called by Weddle himself.  Luckily for them, it worked... or was it luck?

Should Weddle have audibled to the run?  What success rate did he need to make it worth it?

The Situation

In order to figure out whether or not it was the right move, we need to look at the situation as a whole. Some of the factors we have to look at include, the time left in the game, the current down and distance, and the win probabilities when either a) Converting 4th down b) Failing to convert 4th down and c) Punting.

From these numbers, we will be able to figure out what chance of success the Chargers will need on this play to attempt to gain the 1st down rather than punt.

The Clock

It's early in overtime, so the time on clock doesn't really factor in this case.  However, what does matter is that it's overtime.  If a play goes bad here, there's no turning back as Kansas City would have excellent field position for a win.  Many coaches take the opposite approach, refusing to be aggressive early in the game when a mistake can be overcome since there's a lot of time left in the game.

The Down and Distance

Though the graphics on the screen, and the official play-by-play, listed the play as a 4th and 2 from the 28 yard line, the ball was actually spotted on the 27 yard line, making it a 4th and 3 play, as shown below.

The famous fake punt play, actually 4th down and 3 yards to go

The fact that it's 4th and 3 will obviously make it more difficult to convert into a 1st down than 4th & 2, however running a fake gives the Chargers the element of surprise.

Almost Kicking Away a Chance at the Playoffs - Green Bay at Chicago - December 29, 2013

With the NFC North title on the line, the Green Bay Packers came back from a 28-20 deficit against the rival Chicago Bears.  Quarterback Aaron Rodgers, in his first game back from a fractured collarbone, drove the Packers from their own 13 yard line for the winning touchdown to receiver Randall Cobb, also back from injury.  A thrilling finish, one which I watched alongside many Packers fans in a bar in Wisconsin.  (Also at the same time, the Chargers were completing their own comeback, also for a playoff spot)

The Packers comeback almost didn't happen.   Coach Mike McCarthy almost prevented his own team from this comeback by sending out the punt team on a 4th-and-1 situation in their own half of the field. His offense had to talk him out of punting and go for it.  The linked nfl.com article calls it a gamble.  Many others in the bar thought it was an obvious play.

So was it a gamble, the right call, or could it go either way?

The Situation

Losing by 1 point, 28-27, with 4:41 to go in the game, the Packers face a 4th-and-1 at their own 22 yard line. This game is basically a playoff game, with the winner earning a spot in the playoffs as NFC North Champions, and the loser going home.  What should the Packers do in this spot?  To figure this out, we need to see what the Win Probability (WP) of each decision, to punt or to go for it.  We need to look at several factors to see what the right decision is.

The Factors

Coaches and fans can talk about "trusting their defense" or "pinning the other team back", but it basically comes down to several probabilities:

1. The probability of success on this 4th down and 1.
2. The probability of winning the game, given a conversion on this 4th and 1.
3. The probability of winning the game, given a punt to the Bears.

While we might not be completely accurate with these numbers, we can put in some estimates and see which decision gives the best chance of the Packers winning.  To get some ballpark figures, we will once again go to our friends at Advanced NFL Stats.

When NOT to score - Pittsburgh at Green Bay - December 22, 2013

Outside of sportsmanship purposes, is it ever right to NOT go for the most expected points?  Should there be a time when you tell your team to NOT score a touchdown?  If that's true, then wouldn't the defensive team WANT you to score a touchdown?  This scenario came up again in Week 16 of 2013 with the Pittsburgh Steelers visiting the Green Bay Packers at Lambeau Field.

The Situation

Pittsburgh and Green Bay are tied up, 31-31 in the 4th quarter.  On the first play after the 2 minute warning, Steelers safety Troy Polamalu forces a Matt Flynn fumble, recovered by Brett Keisel who returns it to the Packers' 17 yard line.  

The Steelers now have the ball with 1:51 left in the game.  The Packers have all 3 timeouts remaining.  Knowing that a score is highly likely, the Packers proceed to use their timeouts in an attempt to get more time on the clock for a comeback once the Steelers score.

The situation is a favorable one, as they force a 4th and 3 at the 10 yard line with 1:35 left in the game and the field goal team trots out to attempt a 28 yard field goal.  A field goal here would give the Packers over a minute left to tie or win the game and the Packers still have 1 timeout left.  However, an encroachment penalty gives the Steelers an automatic 1st down at the 5 yard line.

At this point, the question is: Should the Steelers intentionally not score until the last second, so they prevent any chance at a Packers comeback?  If this it true, then should the Packers intentionally allow the Steelers to score?  Remember, what's bad for my opponent must be good for me.

What should the Steelers do in this case?

Jamaal Charles Passes to Himself - Real or Fake?

There's a video of Kansas City Chief running back Jamaal Charles in Pumas catching his own 45 yard pass. 

This is a pretty awesome feat for anyone, including NFL players.  Charles is one of the best backs in the NFL and (as a former track star) a very fast guy, but since we never saw the ball actually leave his hand, nor did we see it in flight until he catches it, could it have been faked?  Is it actually possible for him to have caught his own pass 45 yards down the field?  This isn't a feat made to look obviously fake, like Michael Vick throwing a ball out of the stadium, but is something that is in the realm of possibility.  Let’s look at the physics behind what he did.

There are two factors to look at in determining whether this feat is possible or not.  Can Charles realistically run that fast and can Charles throw that ball that high and far?

Let's see if our analysis can help determine if this is possible or not.  Warning, lots of math ahead!

Going for Two. Washington at Atlanta December 15, 2013

Washington coach Mike Shanahan gets the opportunity go for the win in regulation and takes it, going for a 2 point conversion instead of electing to take a PAT and take his chances in Overtime.  QB Kirk Cousins misses the pass and Washington loses to the Atlanta Falcons 26-27.  Regardless of the result, was this the right decision?

The Situation

Down 20-27, Washington QB Kirk Cousins completes a TD pass to WR Santana Moss, pulling the team within 1 point.  There are 18 seconds left in the game, so whatever happens here is highly likely to be the final outcome of regulation.  Coach Shanahan decides to go for a 2 point conversion.  Was this the right move?

This is a relatively simple situation to analyze since there are only a couple of possibilities.

If Washington goes for the PAT, they will go to overtime 98% of the time historically.  That's close enough to 100% for our purposes.  In overtime, there is nominally a 50/50 chance of winning the game.

If Washington goes for the 2PAT, they will convert and win the game x% of the time and lose the game 100-x% of the time.  What is x actually?

Taking the Points, Part II - Miami vs. New England, December 15, 2013

The Miami Dolphins once again faced a "close" 4th down decision nearing halftime of the New England @ Miami tilt in week 15.  Down, 0-3, Miami decided to attempt a field goal, as color announcer Phil Simms said, "It looks like it's a whole yard short ... it's a good decision by the Dolphins [to go for the field goal].  Get on the scoreboard, Jim [Nantz], there nothing worse for a QB or coach to look up at that scoreboard and see that 0."

Was Simms right?  Is it better to kick the field goal here?

The Situation

After the 3rd down pass to Michael Egnew falls short of the line to gain, the Dolphins face 4th down and a long yard (one closer to 2 yards than 0 yards) on the New England 24 yard line with 3:34 left in the first half.  Out trots the FG team and Simms claims it's good to get the points on the board rather than to walk away with nothing.  However, the game of football doesn't care if you score points, you need to out score the opponent, and in this situation, you should maximize the number of Expected Points you're going to get.

So how do we calculate whether it was the right decision to kick the field goal or not?

The Factors

We have to look at several factors to determine whether or not attempting a field goal is the right move here.  Of course, we are simplifying some of these percentages, but if there is an obvious decision, that won't change with fine tuning of these numbers.

1) What is the chance kicker Caleb Sturgis will make the 42 yard field goal attempt?

2) What is the chance Miami will convert this 4th and 1 attempt?

3) If Miami makes the 4th and 1, what are the expected number of points they can expect from this drive?

4) When New England recovers the ball, either after a failed FG try, failed 4th down try, or after a kickoff following a Miami TD, what is their chances of scoring?

Taking the Points - Less Likely to Win? Miami at Pittsburgh December 8, 2013

Conventional Wisdom says to take the points, especially when taking "gimme" points makes your lead go from 3 points to 6 points and forces your opponent to score a touchdown to win the game, rather than being able to tie the game with a field goal.  Depending on the situation, is this always right?  Should you be taking the "gimme" points in this situation at all times?

The Situation

Miami has the ball and is leading Pittsburgh 31-28.  It's 4th and goal on the Pittsburgh 9 yard line and 1:12 left to go in the game.  The obvious play is to kick the field goal, which they do, and they now lead 34-28.  However, on 4th down, with 3 seconds left, the Steelers complete a near miracle 5-lateral play to score a touchdown.  However, Antonio Brown stepped out of bounds on his way to the end zone, ending the game and allowing Miami to escape with a win.

Antonio Brown steps out of bounds before finding paydirt

The fact that Miami won overlooks the 4th and 9 decision a minute before.  Was it the right decision?

The decision comes down to whether the Dolphins should kick the field goal, or run a play on 4th down.

The Factors

There are several factors which can help us decide the right course of action, some are more relevant than others depending on the decision made.  We will look at all probabilities from the Dolphin's point of view.

• What is the probability of making the field goal?
• Given the field goal is made, what is the probability you will win the game?
• If the field goal is not made, what is the probability you will still win the game?
• What is the probability of scoring a touchdown?
• What is the probability of winning the game if you score a touchdown?
• What is the probability of winning the game if you don't score a touchdown?

All factors can be boiled down into one of the preceding factors.  For example, how well your defense is playing or how well the opposing kickoff return unit is playing, all can be taken into account with the above factors.

The Calculations

To determine the best course of action, we need to calculate the total win probability for each action, then figure out which decision is more likely to win the game.  With the game nearly over, the important metric is Win Probability (WP), not Expected Points (EP).  Expected Points is something coaches should be looking to maximize early in the game as it's highly correlated with WP, but by the end of the game, EP and WP can diverge quite a bit.  

Trusting your Kicker - Part 2 - Trestman defends his decision, again with binary thinking

Marc Trestman defended his decision to have Robbie Gould try the 47 yard field goal.  Again, as pointed out in yesterday's entry, he's falling victim to binary thinking.

If you are in the habit of evaluating 72% chances (as Gould's history of making those kicks are) as 100% chance, there's a pretty bad process of thinking going on.

Trusting your Kicker - Levels of Probability - CHI at MIN December 1, 2013

The Situation

In Sudden Death Overtime, Chicago has the ball and is driving after a Minnesota missed field goal (well, kicker Blair Walsh actually made one attempt, but was called back due to a stupid face mask penalty).  

On 2nd down and 7 at the Minnesota 29 yard line, coach Marc Trestman elects to have kicker Robbie Gould try a game winning 47 yard field goal.  Was this the right move?

On CBS, former Ravens coach and current color commentator Brian Billick agreed with Trestman, saying something to the effect of deciding what yard line your kicker can make the kick from, get it there, center the ball, then trust your kicker to make the kick.  Billick basically means the 30 yard line is a plenty good position to kick from, so instead of trying to get more yards, try to kick the FG now and now have anything bad happen.

Why would he say that?

Binary Thinking

Once the offense is in "field goal range," especially in a sudden death situation, most coaches go ultra conservative, making sure the ball isn't turned over.  These coaches decide what "field goal range" is for their kicker, then once they cross that line, worry more about keeping possession, centering the ball and the time on the clock rather than the distance to be kicked.  This is an example of binary thinking, where the kick can be made at one distance, but missed at another distance.  In reality, kickers make shorter kicks with more frequency than longer kicks (duh).  So, why are coaches thinking this way?

The reason coaches engaging in binary thinking decide to kick "too early", is because giving up possession on a potential game winning drive is a disaster.  They decide to turtle up and take the long field goal try, rather than trying to get closer.  Coaches in this situation also typically kick on 3rd down instead of 4th, just in case there's a bad snap or botched hold.

A broad analysis of field goals at the 45-49 yard distance shows a 68.6% chance of making the kick. Since 68.6 is more than 50%, surely it's the right move, right?

Given this number, why would any coach try to move the ball down the field further?  What are the benefits and costs of trying to move the ball down the field further, particularly in this sudden death situation?  

Third Quarter Decisions. One good, one bad

Week 13

Tennessee losing to Indianapolis 7-12 in the 3rd quarter 8:04 left to go.  They've been stuffed up to this point and are now at 4th and goal on the 1/2 yard line.  Play call is bootleg - pass, Touchdown and now they're up 14-12 (though as you know, I would have gone for two there)

NY Jets losing to Miami at home 0-13 in the 3rd quarter, 4:30 left to go.  4th down and 1.  Rex Ryan opts to kick the Field Goal here.  Sure, let's not have any faith in your offense.  Game over.

Edit: Miami goes down and scores a TD to make it 20-3 now.

Who Should be Calling Timeouts? A Simplified Bayes Theorem problem - PIT @ BAL, Thursday November 28, 2013

In an individual game, football is a zero-sum game.  Whatever is good for me is bad for my opponent, and whatever is bad for me is good for my opponent.  So, if I should call a timeout, my opponent definitely shouldn't, right?  What do the announcers think?

Down by 8 points with under 4 minutes to go, the Pittsburgh Steelers need to score a Touchdown and convert a 2 point conversion (2PAT) just to tie it up and potentially send the game to overtime.

The Situation

Pittsburgh is behind Baltimore 14-22 with under 2 minutes left to go in the game.  They need a touchdown and a 2PAT just to tie and potentially send the game to overtime.  Steelers QB Ben Roethlisberger threw an apparent touchdown pass to Heath Miller at 1:52 left, but the replay official rules he was down at the 1/2 yard line.  Announcer Cris Collinsworth remarks that it's a good thing the Steelers haven't scored yet since it allows them to burn some more time off the clock, presumably so if they score, the Ravens can't come back and win the game.  When he said that, the message board I was following at the time blew up and said how wrong he was in case the Steelers don't convert the 2PAT.

After a run for no gain, Baltimore takes its last timeout with 1:32 left.  Should they have taken that timeout?  If not, should the Steelers have done so with 2 timeouts remaining?

This leaves the Steelers with potentially conflicting goals.  If they do tie the game, they want to take as much time off the clock.  However, if they fail to do so, they want as much time on the clock as possible if they recover an onside kick to try to win.

The Factors

The most important, and obvious, factor is whether Pittsburgh can score or not.  However, this point is entirely moot.  At the 1 yard line, even with only 1:32 left, the clock is not the enemy.  Also, if the Steelers can't score in 3 more downs, it doesn't matter whether what's left on the clock since the Ravens will be able to run out the clock.

Another factor is the likelihood the Steelers will recover an obvious onside kick.  This number is less than 20% (to be generous).  If the Steelers don't recover the kick, then the clock doesn't matter.

Ben Watson and the Pythagorean Theorem - AFC Divisional Game Patriots vs. Broncos Jan 14, 2006

The 2005 divisional playoff game (January 14, 2006) between the Patriots and the Broncos featured Patriots TE Ben Watson making one of the greatest hustle plays I had ever seen in my life.  Watch below:

 

A great play, though ultimately for naught as Denver maintained possession at the 1 yard line and would ultimately punch it in on a Mike Anderson TD run.  New England would go on to lose the game, snapping Tom Brady's streak of 10 playoff wins without a loss.

How Far Did Ben Watson Run?

Linebacker Tedy Bruschi said, "We saw Ben was on the other side of the field so he basically had to run like 120 yards, even longer than that, to get that."

A great hustle play for sure, but how far did Ben Watson actually run on that play, and how much further did he go than Champ Bailey, one of the fastest players in the NFL?

Positioning of Watson and Bailey at the time of the interception