Fortune Favors the Bold - Seattle vs. San Francisco - NFC Championship Game January 19, 2014

The Seattle Seahawks are going to Super Bowl XLVIII on the strength of a 23-17 victory over the visiting San Francisco 49ers.  The big play was the 4th and 7 touchdown pass from Russell Wilson to Jermaine Kearse from the 49ers 35 yard line.  Fortune favors the bold, and while some coaches might have opted to take the 53 yard field goal attempt or a punt to pin the 49ers deep in their own territory with plenty of time to get the ball back.  Coach Pete Carroll opted to go for it, and was rewarded.

Seahawks Jermaine Kearse catches this 35 yard TD pass from QB Russell Wilson

Though the decision paid off, we want to look at the mathematics behind the decision to figure out if it was a correct one or not.  Which option was the best in this situation?

The Situation and Options

At the start of the 4th quarter (13:52 remaining), the Seahawks trail 13-17.  The ball is at the 49ers 35 yard line and it's now 4th and 7.  The three options here are all seemingly reasonable:

1. Punting
2. Attempting a Field Goal
3. Going for it

In order to figure out which option is the best, we'll have to make some assumptions and use the Win Probability calculator from Advanced NFL Stats, to break down the expected outcome of each situation.

The Two Worst Kicking Plays of the Playoffs - Indianapolis at New England - January 11, 2014

These were by far the two worst kicking decisions in the playoffs so far.  I'm not going to even do the math on these, but let's see how absurd these decisions are.  One decision was made while desperately behind, the other while comfortably ahead, and while neither determined the outcome of the game, they were both completely absurd.

The Game

The Indianapolis Colts faced the New England Patriots in the AFC Divisional round of the 2014 playoffs.  Due to the some early miscues, the Colts find themselves down in the game early, though only down 21-12 at halftime.  However, it's the 4th quarter decisions that leave me shaking my head.

Giving Up on the Season - Chuck Pagano

In the 4th quarter, the Colts are now down by 3 touchdowns, 22-43, and have the ball on their own 29 yard line with a 4th down and 1 (though it was probably less than 1 yard).  There is 10:30 left in the game.  The Patriots have been running the ball down your throat all game and will do so if they get the ball in an attempt to run out the clock. 

This is an obvious go-for-it situation here if you want to win a playoff game.  Instead, out comes the punt team.  It doesn't matter that field position is bad for the Colts, they're down by 3 touchdowns and desperate.  The Patriots would go on to take 8 more minutes off the clock, and the Colts would only have 1 more possession to close out the game.

When a team is that desperate in a playoff game and you send out the kicking unit, that qualifies as one of the worst kicking decisions in the playoffs, never mind the outcome.

Punting for 6 Yards - Bill Belichick

Later in the same quarter, the Patriots are running the clock down to under 3 minutes when they face a 4th and 10 at the Colts 26 yard line.  A field goal try would be around 44 yards here, a makable distance for kicker Stephen Gostowski.  Going for it would not be easy, but would give the Patriots a chance, however a slim one, to maintain the ball.  Plus, up 3 touchdowns, field position matters less.

Out comes the punt team, and Gostowski punts it into the end zone for a touchback.  Net gain in field position of 6 yards.  Since the Patriots go on to win this handily, nothing Belichick could do here would run their chances of victory, but it just leaves you scratching your head sometimes.

Hidden Plays - First Quarter Plays Set the Stage - Kansas City at Indianapolis, January 4th, 2013

2014 Wild Card Weekend was one for the ages.  Three games decided by a field goal, and the other one close enough to be in doubt until late (though there were plenty of questionable decisions by the losing coach).

The Chiefs/Colts game was crazy, with 89 points scored between the two teams and a 4 touchdown comeback (the 2nd greatest comeback in NFL playoff history, only to this '93 game between the Oilers and the Bills).  The Colt's 45-44 victory will be remembered for a long time in Indianapolis and around the league.

With the game being decided by a single point, one might think the game's most important decisions were made in the 2nd half as Indianapolis made their comeback.  Indeed, it was quite a monumental collapse by Kansas City.  Advanced NFL Stats even looked into the Chiefs' chance of winning if they simply knelt down on every play in the 2nd half.  However, there was a play early in the game that could have helped Kansas City get to an even further lead.

The Situation

With the game tied at 7, Kansas City faced a 4th-and-1 at the Colts' 1 yard line.  They got to this point from an Alex Smith to Dwayne Bowe 63 yard hookup, but only managed 1 yard on the first 3 downs.  Out comes the field goal unit and Ryan Succop kicks a 19 yard field goal to go up by 3.  Was it the right move?  Was it in fact the "safe" play here?

The Factors

Once again, we will look at the probabilities of success and failure for both a 4th down attempt and a field goal, but also look at what the expected outcome of the next Colts possession would be.  To do so, we will break it down into several parts:

1. Chiefs Kick a Field Goal

     a. What is the probability of success or failure?

     b. What is the expected outcome of the Colts' next drive depending on success or failure?

2. Chiefs Go for It on 4th Down

     a. What is the probability of success or failure?

     b. What is the expected outcome of the Colts' next drive depending on success or failure?

Since the game is still in the first half, the clock makes much less of a difference.  Clearly, if it was a tie game with only 2 seconds left to go, the Chief's would maximize win probability instead of trying to score the most points.

The Fine Line Between Genius and Insanity, Eric Weddle - San Diego vs. Kansas City, December 29, 2013

In week 17 of the 2013 season, the San Diego Chargers needed a win (or a tie) against the Kansas City Chiefs to advance to the playoffs.  KC kicker Ryan Succop missed a field goal attempt at the end of regulation to give the Chargers a chance to win it in overtime.  The most memorable play from that overtime period was when Charger safety Eric Weddle, as the personal protector on the punt team, took the snap from punt formation and rushed to gain a first down.  The Chargers go on to kick a field goal on this drive and hold on to win.


This was one of the most gutsy moves of the season, one that wasn't called by head coach Mike McCoy or special teams coach Kevin Spencer, but it was called by Weddle himself.  Luckily for them, it worked... or was it luck?

Should Weddle have audibled to the run?  What success rate did he need to make it worth it?

The Situation

In order to figure out whether or not it was the right move, we need to look at the situation as a whole. Some of the factors we have to look at include, the time left in the game, the current down and distance, and the win probabilities when either a) Converting 4th down b) Failing to convert 4th down and c) Punting.

From these numbers, we will be able to figure out what chance of success the Chargers will need on this play to attempt to gain the 1st down rather than punt.

The Clock

It's early in overtime, so the time on clock doesn't really factor in this case.  However, what does matter is that it's overtime.  If a play goes bad here, there's no turning back as Kansas City would have excellent field position for a win.  Many coaches take the opposite approach, refusing to be aggressive early in the game when a mistake can be overcome since there's a lot of time left in the game.

The Down and Distance

Though the graphics on the screen, and the official play-by-play, listed the play as a 4th and 2 from the 28 yard line, the ball was actually spotted on the 27 yard line, making it a 4th and 3 play, as shown below.

The famous fake punt play, actually 4th down and 3 yards to go

The fact that it's 4th and 3 will obviously make it more difficult to convert into a 1st down than 4th & 2, however running a fake gives the Chargers the element of surprise.

Taking the Points - Less Likely to Win? Miami at Pittsburgh December 8, 2013

Conventional Wisdom says to take the points, especially when taking "gimme" points makes your lead go from 3 points to 6 points and forces your opponent to score a touchdown to win the game, rather than being able to tie the game with a field goal.  Depending on the situation, is this always right?  Should you be taking the "gimme" points in this situation at all times?

The Situation

Miami has the ball and is leading Pittsburgh 31-28.  It's 4th and goal on the Pittsburgh 9 yard line and 1:12 left to go in the game.  The obvious play is to kick the field goal, which they do, and they now lead 34-28.  However, on 4th down, with 3 seconds left, the Steelers complete a near miracle 5-lateral play to score a touchdown.  However, Antonio Brown stepped out of bounds on his way to the end zone, ending the game and allowing Miami to escape with a win.

Antonio Brown steps out of bounds before finding paydirt

The fact that Miami won overlooks the 4th and 9 decision a minute before.  Was it the right decision?

The decision comes down to whether the Dolphins should kick the field goal, or run a play on 4th down.

The Factors

There are several factors which can help us decide the right course of action, some are more relevant than others depending on the decision made.  We will look at all probabilities from the Dolphin's point of view.

• What is the probability of making the field goal?
• Given the field goal is made, what is the probability you will win the game?
• If the field goal is not made, what is the probability you will still win the game?
• What is the probability of scoring a touchdown?
• What is the probability of winning the game if you score a touchdown?
• What is the probability of winning the game if you don't score a touchdown?

All factors can be boiled down into one of the preceding factors.  For example, how well your defense is playing or how well the opposing kickoff return unit is playing, all can be taken into account with the above factors.

The Calculations

To determine the best course of action, we need to calculate the total win probability for each action, then figure out which decision is more likely to win the game.  With the game nearly over, the important metric is Win Probability (WP), not Expected Points (EP).  Expected Points is something coaches should be looking to maximize early in the game as it's highly correlated with WP, but by the end of the game, EP and WP can diverge quite a bit.  

Third Quarter Decisions. One good, one bad

Week 13

Tennessee losing to Indianapolis 7-12 in the 3rd quarter 8:04 left to go.  They've been stuffed up to this point and are now at 4th and goal on the 1/2 yard line.  Play call is bootleg - pass, Touchdown and now they're up 14-12 (though as you know, I would have gone for two there)

NY Jets losing to Miami at home 0-13 in the 3rd quarter, 4:30 left to go.  4th down and 1.  Rex Ryan opts to kick the Field Goal here.  Sure, let's not have any faith in your offense.  Game over.

Edit: Miami goes down and scores a TD to make it 20-3 now.

Playing not to lose in OT? Packers vs. Vikings Nov. 24, 2013

My buddies give me a lot of flack for suggesting to always go for it on 4th down or for a 2 point conversion, so when my instincts said to kick a field goal, but my friend Tony wanted to go for it, I had to take a step back and see if I was wrong. Even though Tony likes trolling, I think he might be onto something.

The situation: 

Green Bay Packers have the ball at 4th down and Goal at the 2 1/2 yard line in overtime.  This is the first possession in OT, so a field goal does not win the game for the Pack outright but gives the Vikings a shot at matching.  Scoring a touchdown ends the game right there for the home team Packers.

The question: What decision gives the Packers the best chance to win the game?  Going for the touchdown, or kicking the field goal?  How do we decide this?

The first question we have to ask is what factors do we have to consider to make this decision?  There are many, many factors that can go into this calculation.  For example, how good is your offense?  How good is the opponent's offense? How good is your kicker?  Do you have momentum on your side?  It would be impossible to evaluate the effect of each of these factors perfectly, but ultimately, they boil down into one of 4 factors:

1) What is the probability of making the field goal?
2) What is the probability of scoring a touchdown?
3) What is the probability of winning the game, if you go for a touchdown and miss?
4) What is the probability of winning the game if you attempt a field goal?

The coaches know (or SHOULD know) this information very, very well.  Even if they can't perfectly quantify it, their gut instinct is usually pretty good at figuring out these percentages.  However, if they're off, then the future calculations might be off as well.

The second part to this decision is how does the math shake out once we figure out what are the relevant factors. Even if one decision is "too risky", is the other decision the better choice, or is it even riskier?  While we won't be able to 100% accurately figure out the percentages, we can at least attempt to decide the best course of action, given the information we have.

Ultimately, we need to look at the chances of winning (or Win Probability, abbreviated WP) of each decision.

if WP(Field Goal) > WP(going for it), then the Packers should have kicked.
if WP(Field Goal) < WP(going for it), then the Packers should have went for it.
if WP(Field Goal) = WP(going for it), then it doesn't really matter either way.