Safe Move = Less Chance of a Win (aka "You play to give yourself a chance!") - Arizona at St. Louis Week Dec 11, 2014

When the Safe Move Makes it Less Likely to Win

On Week 15 of the 2014 NFL Season, the division leading Arizona Cardinals faced off in St. Louis vs. the Rams. In the 4th quarter 6:10 remaining, with the Cardinals' defense playing very well, St. Louis faced a 4th and 1 at the Arizona 1 yard line, down 3-12. Needing a touchdown and a field goal (and assuming no more Arizona points), the "safe" move is to "take the points," and try to get a stop. Taking the points keeps you alive, going for a touchdown and failing effectively means you lose the game as time is running out. But does staying alive actually mean you have a better chance of winning the game?

The Logic

People in favor of taking the Field Goal say "you need to take the points" or "if you fail, you've lost the game. You have to stay in the game to win it!"

The counterargument of going for the touchdown is "You're on the 1 yard line now, it's easier to score a touchdown here and then try for a field goal than it is to kick the field goal now and drive the length of the field for a touchdown!"

Which one is right?

Playing to Win, or Playing for OT? - Rams vs. 49ers, November 2, 2014

In Week 9 of the 2014 NFL season, San Francisco 49ers were losing to the St. Louis Rams 10-13 with just seconds left to go in the game. The 49ers could have taken the "safe" play and kicked a field goal, or taken a more risky play to win the game right away by going for a touchdown. With time running out, most people would have taken the field goal try, gone to overtime, and taken their chances, but what's really the right move here? It turns out it depends, but not necessarily on what you think.

The Factors

The real question to ultimately answer is: Which choice gives the 49ers the best chance to win? Many people say the game isn't played by math, but by players which is of course true. However, if coaches can accurately estimate the chances of success in given situations, it would give them better data with which to make decisions.

Since the game is near the end, we only really have to analyze a few factors: 1) the chance of making the 20 yard field goal try, 2) the chance of making the 3rd and 1 attempt, and 3) the chance of winning the game, if the game goes to overtime.

How not to execute a "go for it"

With 7 minutes in the Sunday Night game on September 28, the Saints were down losing to the Cowboys by 14 points, 17-31. Facing 4th and 9 on their own 40 yard line, prospects were bleak as to win the game (Advanced Football Analytics has it at 2%).

As you might guess, this blog would favor going for it, as you might as well roll the dice and try to give yourself the best chance of winning. Losing by 21 vs. losing by 14 doesn't really matter here. Sean Payton and the Saints trot out the punt team, but they execute a fake punt, putting the ball in the hands of punter Thomas Morestead who, after scrambling to find an open receiver, gets tackled for a 2 yard loss.

Now, while I certainly enjoy watching unpredictable plays and aggressive play calling, this was particularly bad. There were several factors making this a bad play.

1) The offense was down by 14 points late in the game, meaning the defense would be wise to look for trickery in a desperate situation.
2) The primary ball carrier isn't used to handling the ball in this way.
3) The players on the field are not regular starters, in order to not tip off the play.

All in all, just a bad idea. Either punting and hoping for a stop or going for it with a regular offense would have been better. Alternatively, a run might have worked too. It surely would have gotten better results than a 2 yard loss. In fact, the punter should have just thrown the ball away in that spot rather than take the 2 yard loss, not that it matters much.

Ultimately, who do you want throwing the ball here?

Drew Brees career passing stats:
4,564 completions, 6,916 attempts (66%)
51,944 yards (7.5 yards per attempt)
368 TD passes

Thomas Morestead career passing stats:
0 completions, 0 attempts, 0 TD passes

Fortune Favors the Bold - Seattle vs. San Francisco - NFC Championship Game January 19, 2014

The Seattle Seahawks are going to Super Bowl XLVIII on the strength of a 23-17 victory over the visiting San Francisco 49ers.  The big play was the 4th and 7 touchdown pass from Russell Wilson to Jermaine Kearse from the 49ers 35 yard line.  Fortune favors the bold, and while some coaches might have opted to take the 53 yard field goal attempt or a punt to pin the 49ers deep in their own territory with plenty of time to get the ball back.  Coach Pete Carroll opted to go for it, and was rewarded.

Seahawks Jermaine Kearse catches this 35 yard TD pass from QB Russell Wilson

Though the decision paid off, we want to look at the mathematics behind the decision to figure out if it was a correct one or not.  Which option was the best in this situation?

The Situation and Options

At the start of the 4th quarter (13:52 remaining), the Seahawks trail 13-17.  The ball is at the 49ers 35 yard line and it's now 4th and 7.  The three options here are all seemingly reasonable:

1. Punting
2. Attempting a Field Goal
3. Going for it

In order to figure out which option is the best, we'll have to make some assumptions and use the Win Probability calculator from Advanced NFL Stats, to break down the expected outcome of each situation.

The Two Worst Kicking Plays of the Playoffs - Indianapolis at New England - January 11, 2014

These were by far the two worst kicking decisions in the playoffs so far.  I'm not going to even do the math on these, but let's see how absurd these decisions are.  One decision was made while desperately behind, the other while comfortably ahead, and while neither determined the outcome of the game, they were both completely absurd.

The Game

The Indianapolis Colts faced the New England Patriots in the AFC Divisional round of the 2014 playoffs.  Due to the some early miscues, the Colts find themselves down in the game early, though only down 21-12 at halftime.  However, it's the 4th quarter decisions that leave me shaking my head.

Giving Up on the Season - Chuck Pagano

In the 4th quarter, the Colts are now down by 3 touchdowns, 22-43, and have the ball on their own 29 yard line with a 4th down and 1 (though it was probably less than 1 yard).  There is 10:30 left in the game.  The Patriots have been running the ball down your throat all game and will do so if they get the ball in an attempt to run out the clock. 

This is an obvious go-for-it situation here if you want to win a playoff game.  Instead, out comes the punt team.  It doesn't matter that field position is bad for the Colts, they're down by 3 touchdowns and desperate.  The Patriots would go on to take 8 more minutes off the clock, and the Colts would only have 1 more possession to close out the game.

When a team is that desperate in a playoff game and you send out the kicking unit, that qualifies as one of the worst kicking decisions in the playoffs, never mind the outcome.

Punting for 6 Yards - Bill Belichick

Later in the same quarter, the Patriots are running the clock down to under 3 minutes when they face a 4th and 10 at the Colts 26 yard line.  A field goal try would be around 44 yards here, a makable distance for kicker Stephen Gostowski.  Going for it would not be easy, but would give the Patriots a chance, however a slim one, to maintain the ball.  Plus, up 3 touchdowns, field position matters less.

Out comes the punt team, and Gostowski punts it into the end zone for a touchback.  Net gain in field position of 6 yards.  Since the Patriots go on to win this handily, nothing Belichick could do here would run their chances of victory, but it just leaves you scratching your head sometimes.

Hidden Plays - First Quarter Plays Set the Stage - Kansas City at Indianapolis, January 4th, 2013

2014 Wild Card Weekend was one for the ages.  Three games decided by a field goal, and the other one close enough to be in doubt until late (though there were plenty of questionable decisions by the losing coach).

The Chiefs/Colts game was crazy, with 89 points scored between the two teams and a 4 touchdown comeback (the 2nd greatest comeback in NFL playoff history, only to this '93 game between the Oilers and the Bills).  The Colt's 45-44 victory will be remembered for a long time in Indianapolis and around the league.

With the game being decided by a single point, one might think the game's most important decisions were made in the 2nd half as Indianapolis made their comeback.  Indeed, it was quite a monumental collapse by Kansas City.  Advanced NFL Stats even looked into the Chiefs' chance of winning if they simply knelt down on every play in the 2nd half.  However, there was a play early in the game that could have helped Kansas City get to an even further lead.

The Situation

With the game tied at 7, Kansas City faced a 4th-and-1 at the Colts' 1 yard line.  They got to this point from an Alex Smith to Dwayne Bowe 63 yard hookup, but only managed 1 yard on the first 3 downs.  Out comes the field goal unit and Ryan Succop kicks a 19 yard field goal to go up by 3.  Was it the right move?  Was it in fact the "safe" play here?

The Factors

Once again, we will look at the probabilities of success and failure for both a 4th down attempt and a field goal, but also look at what the expected outcome of the next Colts possession would be.  To do so, we will break it down into several parts:

1. Chiefs Kick a Field Goal

     a. What is the probability of success or failure?

     b. What is the expected outcome of the Colts' next drive depending on success or failure?

2. Chiefs Go for It on 4th Down

     a. What is the probability of success or failure?

     b. What is the expected outcome of the Colts' next drive depending on success or failure?

Since the game is still in the first half, the clock makes much less of a difference.  Clearly, if it was a tie game with only 2 seconds left to go, the Chief's would maximize win probability instead of trying to score the most points.

The Fine Line Between Genius and Insanity, Eric Weddle - San Diego vs. Kansas City, December 29, 2013

In week 17 of the 2013 season, the San Diego Chargers needed a win (or a tie) against the Kansas City Chiefs to advance to the playoffs.  KC kicker Ryan Succop missed a field goal attempt at the end of regulation to give the Chargers a chance to win it in overtime.  The most memorable play from that overtime period was when Charger safety Eric Weddle, as the personal protector on the punt team, took the snap from punt formation and rushed to gain a first down.  The Chargers go on to kick a field goal on this drive and hold on to win.


This was one of the most gutsy moves of the season, one that wasn't called by head coach Mike McCoy or special teams coach Kevin Spencer, but it was called by Weddle himself.  Luckily for them, it worked... or was it luck?

Should Weddle have audibled to the run?  What success rate did he need to make it worth it?

The Situation

In order to figure out whether or not it was the right move, we need to look at the situation as a whole. Some of the factors we have to look at include, the time left in the game, the current down and distance, and the win probabilities when either a) Converting 4th down b) Failing to convert 4th down and c) Punting.

From these numbers, we will be able to figure out what chance of success the Chargers will need on this play to attempt to gain the 1st down rather than punt.

The Clock

It's early in overtime, so the time on clock doesn't really factor in this case.  However, what does matter is that it's overtime.  If a play goes bad here, there's no turning back as Kansas City would have excellent field position for a win.  Many coaches take the opposite approach, refusing to be aggressive early in the game when a mistake can be overcome since there's a lot of time left in the game.

The Down and Distance

Though the graphics on the screen, and the official play-by-play, listed the play as a 4th and 2 from the 28 yard line, the ball was actually spotted on the 27 yard line, making it a 4th and 3 play, as shown below.

The famous fake punt play, actually 4th down and 3 yards to go

The fact that it's 4th and 3 will obviously make it more difficult to convert into a 1st down than 4th & 2, however running a fake gives the Chargers the element of surprise.

Almost Kicking Away a Chance at the Playoffs - Green Bay at Chicago - December 29, 2013

With the NFC North title on the line, the Green Bay Packers came back from a 28-20 deficit against the rival Chicago Bears.  Quarterback Aaron Rodgers, in his first game back from a fractured collarbone, drove the Packers from their own 13 yard line for the winning touchdown to receiver Randall Cobb, also back from injury.  A thrilling finish, one which I watched alongside many Packers fans in a bar in Wisconsin.  (Also at the same time, the Chargers were completing their own comeback, also for a playoff spot)

The Packers comeback almost didn't happen.   Coach Mike McCarthy almost prevented his own team from this comeback by sending out the punt team on a 4th-and-1 situation in their own half of the field. His offense had to talk him out of punting and go for it.  The linked nfl.com article calls it a gamble.  Many others in the bar thought it was an obvious play.

So was it a gamble, the right call, or could it go either way?

The Situation

Losing by 1 point, 28-27, with 4:41 to go in the game, the Packers face a 4th-and-1 at their own 22 yard line. This game is basically a playoff game, with the winner earning a spot in the playoffs as NFC North Champions, and the loser going home.  What should the Packers do in this spot?  To figure this out, we need to see what the Win Probability (WP) of each decision, to punt or to go for it.  We need to look at several factors to see what the right decision is.

The Factors

Coaches and fans can talk about "trusting their defense" or "pinning the other team back", but it basically comes down to several probabilities:

1. The probability of success on this 4th down and 1.
2. The probability of winning the game, given a conversion on this 4th and 1.
3. The probability of winning the game, given a punt to the Bears.

While we might not be completely accurate with these numbers, we can put in some estimates and see which decision gives the best chance of the Packers winning.  To get some ballpark figures, we will once again go to our friends at Advanced NFL Stats.

Taking the Points, Part II - Miami vs. New England, December 15, 2013

The Miami Dolphins once again faced a "close" 4th down decision nearing halftime of the New England @ Miami tilt in week 15.  Down, 0-3, Miami decided to attempt a field goal, as color announcer Phil Simms said, "It looks like it's a whole yard short ... it's a good decision by the Dolphins [to go for the field goal].  Get on the scoreboard, Jim [Nantz], there nothing worse for a QB or coach to look up at that scoreboard and see that 0."

Was Simms right?  Is it better to kick the field goal here?

The Situation

After the 3rd down pass to Michael Egnew falls short of the line to gain, the Dolphins face 4th down and a long yard (one closer to 2 yards than 0 yards) on the New England 24 yard line with 3:34 left in the first half.  Out trots the FG team and Simms claims it's good to get the points on the board rather than to walk away with nothing.  However, the game of football doesn't care if you score points, you need to out score the opponent, and in this situation, you should maximize the number of Expected Points you're going to get.

So how do we calculate whether it was the right decision to kick the field goal or not?

The Factors

We have to look at several factors to determine whether or not attempting a field goal is the right move here.  Of course, we are simplifying some of these percentages, but if there is an obvious decision, that won't change with fine tuning of these numbers.

1) What is the chance kicker Caleb Sturgis will make the 42 yard field goal attempt?

2) What is the chance Miami will convert this 4th and 1 attempt?

3) If Miami makes the 4th and 1, what are the expected number of points they can expect from this drive?

4) When New England recovers the ball, either after a failed FG try, failed 4th down try, or after a kickoff following a Miami TD, what is their chances of scoring?

Playing not to lose in OT? Packers vs. Vikings Nov. 24, 2013

My buddies give me a lot of flack for suggesting to always go for it on 4th down or for a 2 point conversion, so when my instincts said to kick a field goal, but my friend Tony wanted to go for it, I had to take a step back and see if I was wrong. Even though Tony likes trolling, I think he might be onto something.

The situation: 

Green Bay Packers have the ball at 4th down and Goal at the 2 1/2 yard line in overtime.  This is the first possession in OT, so a field goal does not win the game for the Pack outright but gives the Vikings a shot at matching.  Scoring a touchdown ends the game right there for the home team Packers.

The question: What decision gives the Packers the best chance to win the game?  Going for the touchdown, or kicking the field goal?  How do we decide this?

The first question we have to ask is what factors do we have to consider to make this decision?  There are many, many factors that can go into this calculation.  For example, how good is your offense?  How good is the opponent's offense? How good is your kicker?  Do you have momentum on your side?  It would be impossible to evaluate the effect of each of these factors perfectly, but ultimately, they boil down into one of 4 factors:

1) What is the probability of making the field goal?
2) What is the probability of scoring a touchdown?
3) What is the probability of winning the game, if you go for a touchdown and miss?
4) What is the probability of winning the game if you attempt a field goal?

The coaches know (or SHOULD know) this information very, very well.  Even if they can't perfectly quantify it, their gut instinct is usually pretty good at figuring out these percentages.  However, if they're off, then the future calculations might be off as well.

The second part to this decision is how does the math shake out once we figure out what are the relevant factors. Even if one decision is "too risky", is the other decision the better choice, or is it even riskier?  While we won't be able to 100% accurately figure out the percentages, we can at least attempt to decide the best course of action, given the information we have.

Ultimately, we need to look at the chances of winning (or Win Probability, abbreviated WP) of each decision.

if WP(Field Goal) > WP(going for it), then the Packers should have kicked.
if WP(Field Goal) < WP(going for it), then the Packers should have went for it.
if WP(Field Goal) = WP(going for it), then it doesn't really matter either way.