The Fine Line Between Genius and Insanity, Eric Weddle - San Diego vs. Kansas City, December 29, 2013

In week 17 of the 2013 season, the San Diego Chargers needed a win (or a tie) against the Kansas City Chiefs to advance to the playoffs.  KC kicker Ryan Succop missed a field goal attempt at the end of regulation to give the Chargers a chance to win it in overtime.  The most memorable play from that overtime period was when Charger safety Eric Weddle, as the personal protector on the punt team, took the snap from punt formation and rushed to gain a first down.  The Chargers go on to kick a field goal on this drive and hold on to win.


This was one of the most gutsy moves of the season, one that wasn't called by head coach Mike McCoy or special teams coach Kevin Spencer, but it was called by Weddle himself.  Luckily for them, it worked... or was it luck?

Should Weddle have audibled to the run?  What success rate did he need to make it worth it?

The Situation

In order to figure out whether or not it was the right move, we need to look at the situation as a whole. Some of the factors we have to look at include, the time left in the game, the current down and distance, and the win probabilities when either a) Converting 4th down b) Failing to convert 4th down and c) Punting.

From these numbers, we will be able to figure out what chance of success the Chargers will need on this play to attempt to gain the 1st down rather than punt.

The Clock

It's early in overtime, so the time on clock doesn't really factor in this case.  However, what does matter is that it's overtime.  If a play goes bad here, there's no turning back as Kansas City would have excellent field position for a win.  Many coaches take the opposite approach, refusing to be aggressive early in the game when a mistake can be overcome since there's a lot of time left in the game.

The Down and Distance

Though the graphics on the screen, and the official play-by-play, listed the play as a 4th and 2 from the 28 yard line, the ball was actually spotted on the 27 yard line, making it a 4th and 3 play, as shown below.

The famous fake punt play, actually 4th down and 3 yards to go

The fact that it's 4th and 3 will obviously make it more difficult to convert into a 1st down than 4th & 2, however running a fake gives the Chargers the element of surprise.

Almost Kicking Away a Chance at the Playoffs - Green Bay at Chicago - December 29, 2013

With the NFC North title on the line, the Green Bay Packers came back from a 28-20 deficit against the rival Chicago Bears.  Quarterback Aaron Rodgers, in his first game back from a fractured collarbone, drove the Packers from their own 13 yard line for the winning touchdown to receiver Randall Cobb, also back from injury.  A thrilling finish, one which I watched alongside many Packers fans in a bar in Wisconsin.  (Also at the same time, the Chargers were completing their own comeback, also for a playoff spot)

The Packers comeback almost didn't happen.   Coach Mike McCarthy almost prevented his own team from this comeback by sending out the punt team on a 4th-and-1 situation in their own half of the field. His offense had to talk him out of punting and go for it.  The linked nfl.com article calls it a gamble.  Many others in the bar thought it was an obvious play.

So was it a gamble, the right call, or could it go either way?

The Situation

Losing by 1 point, 28-27, with 4:41 to go in the game, the Packers face a 4th-and-1 at their own 22 yard line. This game is basically a playoff game, with the winner earning a spot in the playoffs as NFC North Champions, and the loser going home.  What should the Packers do in this spot?  To figure this out, we need to see what the Win Probability (WP) of each decision, to punt or to go for it.  We need to look at several factors to see what the right decision is.

The Factors

Coaches and fans can talk about "trusting their defense" or "pinning the other team back", but it basically comes down to several probabilities:

1. The probability of success on this 4th down and 1.
2. The probability of winning the game, given a conversion on this 4th and 1.
3. The probability of winning the game, given a punt to the Bears.

While we might not be completely accurate with these numbers, we can put in some estimates and see which decision gives the best chance of the Packers winning.  To get some ballpark figures, we will once again go to our friends at Advanced NFL Stats.

When NOT to score - Pittsburgh at Green Bay - December 22, 2013

Outside of sportsmanship purposes, is it ever right to NOT go for the most expected points?  Should there be a time when you tell your team to NOT score a touchdown?  If that's true, then wouldn't the defensive team WANT you to score a touchdown?  This scenario came up again in Week 16 of 2013 with the Pittsburgh Steelers visiting the Green Bay Packers at Lambeau Field.

The Situation

Pittsburgh and Green Bay are tied up, 31-31 in the 4th quarter.  On the first play after the 2 minute warning, Steelers safety Troy Polamalu forces a Matt Flynn fumble, recovered by Brett Keisel who returns it to the Packers' 17 yard line.  

The Steelers now have the ball with 1:51 left in the game.  The Packers have all 3 timeouts remaining.  Knowing that a score is highly likely, the Packers proceed to use their timeouts in an attempt to get more time on the clock for a comeback once the Steelers score.

The situation is a favorable one, as they force a 4th and 3 at the 10 yard line with 1:35 left in the game and the field goal team trots out to attempt a 28 yard field goal.  A field goal here would give the Packers over a minute left to tie or win the game and the Packers still have 1 timeout left.  However, an encroachment penalty gives the Steelers an automatic 1st down at the 5 yard line.

At this point, the question is: Should the Steelers intentionally not score until the last second, so they prevent any chance at a Packers comeback?  If this it true, then should the Packers intentionally allow the Steelers to score?  Remember, what's bad for my opponent must be good for me.

What should the Steelers do in this case?

Taking the Points, Part II - Miami vs. New England, December 15, 2013

The Miami Dolphins once again faced a "close" 4th down decision nearing halftime of the New England @ Miami tilt in week 15.  Down, 0-3, Miami decided to attempt a field goal, as color announcer Phil Simms said, "It looks like it's a whole yard short ... it's a good decision by the Dolphins [to go for the field goal].  Get on the scoreboard, Jim [Nantz], there nothing worse for a QB or coach to look up at that scoreboard and see that 0."

Was Simms right?  Is it better to kick the field goal here?

The Situation

After the 3rd down pass to Michael Egnew falls short of the line to gain, the Dolphins face 4th down and a long yard (one closer to 2 yards than 0 yards) on the New England 24 yard line with 3:34 left in the first half.  Out trots the FG team and Simms claims it's good to get the points on the board rather than to walk away with nothing.  However, the game of football doesn't care if you score points, you need to out score the opponent, and in this situation, you should maximize the number of Expected Points you're going to get.

So how do we calculate whether it was the right decision to kick the field goal or not?

The Factors

We have to look at several factors to determine whether or not attempting a field goal is the right move here.  Of course, we are simplifying some of these percentages, but if there is an obvious decision, that won't change with fine tuning of these numbers.

1) What is the chance kicker Caleb Sturgis will make the 42 yard field goal attempt?

2) What is the chance Miami will convert this 4th and 1 attempt?

3) If Miami makes the 4th and 1, what are the expected number of points they can expect from this drive?

4) When New England recovers the ball, either after a failed FG try, failed 4th down try, or after a kickoff following a Miami TD, what is their chances of scoring?

Trusting your Kicker - Levels of Probability - CHI at MIN December 1, 2013

The Situation

In Sudden Death Overtime, Chicago has the ball and is driving after a Minnesota missed field goal (well, kicker Blair Walsh actually made one attempt, but was called back due to a stupid face mask penalty).  

On 2nd down and 7 at the Minnesota 29 yard line, coach Marc Trestman elects to have kicker Robbie Gould try a game winning 47 yard field goal.  Was this the right move?

On CBS, former Ravens coach and current color commentator Brian Billick agreed with Trestman, saying something to the effect of deciding what yard line your kicker can make the kick from, get it there, center the ball, then trust your kicker to make the kick.  Billick basically means the 30 yard line is a plenty good position to kick from, so instead of trying to get more yards, try to kick the FG now and now have anything bad happen.

Why would he say that?

Binary Thinking

Once the offense is in "field goal range," especially in a sudden death situation, most coaches go ultra conservative, making sure the ball isn't turned over.  These coaches decide what "field goal range" is for their kicker, then once they cross that line, worry more about keeping possession, centering the ball and the time on the clock rather than the distance to be kicked.  This is an example of binary thinking, where the kick can be made at one distance, but missed at another distance.  In reality, kickers make shorter kicks with more frequency than longer kicks (duh).  So, why are coaches thinking this way?

The reason coaches engaging in binary thinking decide to kick "too early", is because giving up possession on a potential game winning drive is a disaster.  They decide to turtle up and take the long field goal try, rather than trying to get closer.  Coaches in this situation also typically kick on 3rd down instead of 4th, just in case there's a bad snap or botched hold.

A broad analysis of field goals at the 45-49 yard distance shows a 68.6% chance of making the kick. Since 68.6 is more than 50%, surely it's the right move, right?

Given this number, why would any coach try to move the ball down the field further?  What are the benefits and costs of trying to move the ball down the field further, particularly in this sudden death situation?  

Third Quarter Decisions. One good, one bad

Week 13

Tennessee losing to Indianapolis 7-12 in the 3rd quarter 8:04 left to go.  They've been stuffed up to this point and are now at 4th and goal on the 1/2 yard line.  Play call is bootleg - pass, Touchdown and now they're up 14-12 (though as you know, I would have gone for two there)

NY Jets losing to Miami at home 0-13 in the 3rd quarter, 4:30 left to go.  4th down and 1.  Rex Ryan opts to kick the Field Goal here.  Sure, let's not have any faith in your offense.  Game over.

Edit: Miami goes down and scores a TD to make it 20-3 now.

Who Should be Calling Timeouts? A Simplified Bayes Theorem problem - PIT @ BAL, Thursday November 28, 2013

In an individual game, football is a zero-sum game.  Whatever is good for me is bad for my opponent, and whatever is bad for me is good for my opponent.  So, if I should call a timeout, my opponent definitely shouldn't, right?  What do the announcers think?

Down by 8 points with under 4 minutes to go, the Pittsburgh Steelers need to score a Touchdown and convert a 2 point conversion (2PAT) just to tie it up and potentially send the game to overtime.

The Situation

Pittsburgh is behind Baltimore 14-22 with under 2 minutes left to go in the game.  They need a touchdown and a 2PAT just to tie and potentially send the game to overtime.  Steelers QB Ben Roethlisberger threw an apparent touchdown pass to Heath Miller at 1:52 left, but the replay official rules he was down at the 1/2 yard line.  Announcer Cris Collinsworth remarks that it's a good thing the Steelers haven't scored yet since it allows them to burn some more time off the clock, presumably so if they score, the Ravens can't come back and win the game.  When he said that, the message board I was following at the time blew up and said how wrong he was in case the Steelers don't convert the 2PAT.

After a run for no gain, Baltimore takes its last timeout with 1:32 left.  Should they have taken that timeout?  If not, should the Steelers have done so with 2 timeouts remaining?

This leaves the Steelers with potentially conflicting goals.  If they do tie the game, they want to take as much time off the clock.  However, if they fail to do so, they want as much time on the clock as possible if they recover an onside kick to try to win.

The Factors

The most important, and obvious, factor is whether Pittsburgh can score or not.  However, this point is entirely moot.  At the 1 yard line, even with only 1:32 left, the clock is not the enemy.  Also, if the Steelers can't score in 3 more downs, it doesn't matter whether what's left on the clock since the Ravens will be able to run out the clock.

Another factor is the likelihood the Steelers will recover an obvious onside kick.  This number is less than 20% (to be generous).  If the Steelers don't recover the kick, then the clock doesn't matter.

Playing not to lose in OT? Packers vs. Vikings Nov. 24, 2013

My buddies give me a lot of flack for suggesting to always go for it on 4th down or for a 2 point conversion, so when my instincts said to kick a field goal, but my friend Tony wanted to go for it, I had to take a step back and see if I was wrong. Even though Tony likes trolling, I think he might be onto something.

The situation: 

Green Bay Packers have the ball at 4th down and Goal at the 2 1/2 yard line in overtime.  This is the first possession in OT, so a field goal does not win the game for the Pack outright but gives the Vikings a shot at matching.  Scoring a touchdown ends the game right there for the home team Packers.

The question: What decision gives the Packers the best chance to win the game?  Going for the touchdown, or kicking the field goal?  How do we decide this?

The first question we have to ask is what factors do we have to consider to make this decision?  There are many, many factors that can go into this calculation.  For example, how good is your offense?  How good is the opponent's offense? How good is your kicker?  Do you have momentum on your side?  It would be impossible to evaluate the effect of each of these factors perfectly, but ultimately, they boil down into one of 4 factors:

1) What is the probability of making the field goal?
2) What is the probability of scoring a touchdown?
3) What is the probability of winning the game, if you go for a touchdown and miss?
4) What is the probability of winning the game if you attempt a field goal?

The coaches know (or SHOULD know) this information very, very well.  Even if they can't perfectly quantify it, their gut instinct is usually pretty good at figuring out these percentages.  However, if they're off, then the future calculations might be off as well.

The second part to this decision is how does the math shake out once we figure out what are the relevant factors. Even if one decision is "too risky", is the other decision the better choice, or is it even riskier?  While we won't be able to 100% accurately figure out the percentages, we can at least attempt to decide the best course of action, given the information we have.

Ultimately, we need to look at the chances of winning (or Win Probability, abbreviated WP) of each decision.

if WP(Field Goal) > WP(going for it), then the Packers should have kicked.
if WP(Field Goal) < WP(going for it), then the Packers should have went for it.
if WP(Field Goal) = WP(going for it), then it doesn't really matter either way.