Sunday, December 1, 2013

Trusting your Kicker - Levels of Probability - CHI at MIN December 1, 2013

The Situation

In Sudden Death Overtime, Chicago has the ball and is driving after a Minnesota missed field goal (well, kicker Blair Walsh actually made one attempt, but was called back due to a stupid face mask penalty).  

On 2nd down and 7 at the Minnesota 29 yard line, coach Marc Trestman elects to have kicker Robbie Gould try a game winning 47 yard field goal.  Was this the right move?

On CBS, former Ravens coach and current color commentator Brian Billick agreed with Trestman, saying something to the effect of deciding what yard line your kicker can make the kick from, get it there, center the ball, then trust your kicker to make the kick.  Billick basically means the 30 yard line is a plenty good position to kick from, so instead of trying to get more yards, try to kick the FG now and now have anything bad happen.

Why would he say that?

Binary Thinking

Once the offense is in "field goal range," especially in a sudden death situation, most coaches go ultra conservative, making sure the ball isn't turned over.  These coaches decide what "field goal range" is for their kicker, then once they cross that line, worry more about keeping possession, centering the ball and the time on the clock rather than the distance to be kicked.  This is an example of binary thinking, where the kick can be made at one distance, but missed at another distance.  In reality, kickers make shorter kicks with more frequency than longer kicks (duh).  So, why are coaches thinking this way?

The reason coaches engaging in binary thinking decide to kick "too early", is because giving up possession on a potential game winning drive is a disaster.  They decide to turtle up and take the long field goal try, rather than trying to get closer.  Coaches in this situation also typically kick on 3rd down instead of 4th, just in case there's a bad snap or botched hold.

A broad analysis of field goals at the 45-49 yard distance shows a 68.6% chance of making the kick. Since 68.6 is more than 50%, surely it's the right move, right?


Given this number, why would any coach try to move the ball down the field further?  What are the benefits and costs of trying to move the ball down the field further, particularly in this sudden death situation?  

The Factors

In addition to the kicker's chance of success (which seems to be ignored by coaches who think "field goal range" is an all or nothing proposition), there are a couple of other factors as to why a coach might try to move down the field more.

  1. Time Left on the Clock
  2. Current Field Position
  3. Faith in your own offense to not turn the ball over

Time Left on the Clock


At this point in Overtime, there is 4:12 left on the clock.  Why would this matter?  Well, if the kick is made, it doesn't since the Bears win.  However, if there is a missed field goal, having more time on the clock benefits the Vikings.

Note, this is different from a situation where the clock is about to expire at the end of a half or game, where at team will need to kick on 2nd down to avoid the clock running out.  

Current Field Position


Again, why does current field position matter, outside of the chance of your kicker making the kick?  And once again, if the kick is made, it doesn't matter.  However, if the kick is missed, clearly having the ball further in Vikings territory would benefit the Bears more.

Faith in your Offense


This is actually a big factor.  If you don't trust your offense to hold the ball, then it skews the decision more towards kicking now.  However, if you do trust your offense to protect the ball, then it skews the decision to get more yards.

The Calculations

We're not going to do as much math here, but let's just see what are the benefits of kicking now vs. kicking later.

Kicking the Field Goal Immediately


Pros:
Less chance of turning the ball over
Have another chance on a botched snap or other miscue

Cons:
Less chance of success of making the kick
Leaves more time on the clock in case of a miss
Worse field position in case of a miss

Running a play on 2nd and 3rd down, then kicking


Pros:
Can move the ball closer to give your kicker a better chance
More time off the clock if you miss
Better field position for your defense if you miss
Can score a touchdown outright, not needing a field goal try

Cons:
Possibility of turning the ball over
Leaves less of an opportunity to replay the try in case there's a bad snap or hold

Conclusion

Even without doing any mathematical work, it's clear the Bears should have tried for more yardage instead of settling for a 47 yard field goal try, especially on 2nd down.  In the case where the kick will be made, most of these factors will not matter.  However, in case of a miss, then these factors can matter quite a bit.  Since making or missing the field goal has the most direct correlation with winning the game in this case, why not take those downs to give your kicker a better chance?

Looking at the field goal analysis, you can see a kick from 40-44 yards has a 76.2% chance of making it, a huge jump from 68.2%.  If you can even get the ball in closer, say to a 35-39 field goal, the chance of making it goes to 83%.  In the meantime, not only do you give your kicker a better chance of making a kick, but you also move the ball down the field and eat up some clock in the meantime.  Sure, you might turn the ball over one of these times, but that has a much slimmer chance of happening than the gains your team makes by getting closer.

What Happened

In the actual game, Robbie Gould, despite a career success of 72% from 40-49 yards out, missed the kick and the Vikings drove for the winning field goal shortly after, preventing them from being the first team since the '71 Raiders to tie in back to back games.  

What do you think?

Please feel free to send me your comments.  Is the chance of a turnover that great in this spot?  Should Gould have just made the kick?  Will Gould be the goat, rather than his coach?

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