Going for Two. Washington at Atlanta December 15, 2013

Washington coach Mike Shanahan gets the opportunity go for the win in regulation and takes it, going for a 2 point conversion instead of electing to take a PAT and take his chances in Overtime.  QB Kirk Cousins misses the pass and Washington loses to the Atlanta Falcons 26-27.  Regardless of the result, was this the right decision?

The Situation

Down 20-27, Washington QB Kirk Cousins completes a TD pass to WR Santana Moss, pulling the team within 1 point.  There are 18 seconds left in the game, so whatever happens here is highly likely to be the final outcome of regulation.  Coach Shanahan decides to go for a 2 point conversion.  Was this the right move?

This is a relatively simple situation to analyze since there are only a couple of possibilities.

If Washington goes for the PAT, they will go to overtime 98% of the time historically.  That's close enough to 100% for our purposes.  In overtime, there is nominally a 50/50 chance of winning the game.

If Washington goes for the 2PAT, they will convert and win the game x% of the time and lose the game 100-x% of the time.  What is x actually?

Trusting your Kicker - Part 2 - Trestman defends his decision, again with binary thinking

Marc Trestman defended his decision to have Robbie Gould try the 47 yard field goal.  Again, as pointed out in yesterday's entry, he's falling victim to binary thinking.

If you are in the habit of evaluating 72% chances (as Gould's history of making those kicks are) as 100% chance, there's a pretty bad process of thinking going on.

Trusting your Kicker - Levels of Probability - CHI at MIN December 1, 2013

The Situation

In Sudden Death Overtime, Chicago has the ball and is driving after a Minnesota missed field goal (well, kicker Blair Walsh actually made one attempt, but was called back due to a stupid face mask penalty).  

On 2nd down and 7 at the Minnesota 29 yard line, coach Marc Trestman elects to have kicker Robbie Gould try a game winning 47 yard field goal.  Was this the right move?

On CBS, former Ravens coach and current color commentator Brian Billick agreed with Trestman, saying something to the effect of deciding what yard line your kicker can make the kick from, get it there, center the ball, then trust your kicker to make the kick.  Billick basically means the 30 yard line is a plenty good position to kick from, so instead of trying to get more yards, try to kick the FG now and now have anything bad happen.

Why would he say that?

Binary Thinking

Once the offense is in "field goal range," especially in a sudden death situation, most coaches go ultra conservative, making sure the ball isn't turned over.  These coaches decide what "field goal range" is for their kicker, then once they cross that line, worry more about keeping possession, centering the ball and the time on the clock rather than the distance to be kicked.  This is an example of binary thinking, where the kick can be made at one distance, but missed at another distance.  In reality, kickers make shorter kicks with more frequency than longer kicks (duh).  So, why are coaches thinking this way?

The reason coaches engaging in binary thinking decide to kick "too early", is because giving up possession on a potential game winning drive is a disaster.  They decide to turtle up and take the long field goal try, rather than trying to get closer.  Coaches in this situation also typically kick on 3rd down instead of 4th, just in case there's a bad snap or botched hold.

A broad analysis of field goals at the 45-49 yard distance shows a 68.6% chance of making the kick. Since 68.6 is more than 50%, surely it's the right move, right?

Given this number, why would any coach try to move the ball down the field further?  What are the benefits and costs of trying to move the ball down the field further, particularly in this sudden death situation?  

Who Should be Calling Timeouts? A Simplified Bayes Theorem problem - PIT @ BAL, Thursday November 28, 2013

In an individual game, football is a zero-sum game.  Whatever is good for me is bad for my opponent, and whatever is bad for me is good for my opponent.  So, if I should call a timeout, my opponent definitely shouldn't, right?  What do the announcers think?

Down by 8 points with under 4 minutes to go, the Pittsburgh Steelers need to score a Touchdown and convert a 2 point conversion (2PAT) just to tie it up and potentially send the game to overtime.

The Situation

Pittsburgh is behind Baltimore 14-22 with under 2 minutes left to go in the game.  They need a touchdown and a 2PAT just to tie and potentially send the game to overtime.  Steelers QB Ben Roethlisberger threw an apparent touchdown pass to Heath Miller at 1:52 left, but the replay official rules he was down at the 1/2 yard line.  Announcer Cris Collinsworth remarks that it's a good thing the Steelers haven't scored yet since it allows them to burn some more time off the clock, presumably so if they score, the Ravens can't come back and win the game.  When he said that, the message board I was following at the time blew up and said how wrong he was in case the Steelers don't convert the 2PAT.

After a run for no gain, Baltimore takes its last timeout with 1:32 left.  Should they have taken that timeout?  If not, should the Steelers have done so with 2 timeouts remaining?

This leaves the Steelers with potentially conflicting goals.  If they do tie the game, they want to take as much time off the clock.  However, if they fail to do so, they want as much time on the clock as possible if they recover an onside kick to try to win.

The Factors

The most important, and obvious, factor is whether Pittsburgh can score or not.  However, this point is entirely moot.  At the 1 yard line, even with only 1:32 left, the clock is not the enemy.  Also, if the Steelers can't score in 3 more downs, it doesn't matter whether what's left on the clock since the Ravens will be able to run out the clock.

Another factor is the likelihood the Steelers will recover an obvious onside kick.  This number is less than 20% (to be generous).  If the Steelers don't recover the kick, then the clock doesn't matter.

Playing not to lose in OT? Packers vs. Vikings Nov. 24, 2013

My buddies give me a lot of flack for suggesting to always go for it on 4th down or for a 2 point conversion, so when my instincts said to kick a field goal, but my friend Tony wanted to go for it, I had to take a step back and see if I was wrong. Even though Tony likes trolling, I think he might be onto something.

The situation: 

Green Bay Packers have the ball at 4th down and Goal at the 2 1/2 yard line in overtime.  This is the first possession in OT, so a field goal does not win the game for the Pack outright but gives the Vikings a shot at matching.  Scoring a touchdown ends the game right there for the home team Packers.

The question: What decision gives the Packers the best chance to win the game?  Going for the touchdown, or kicking the field goal?  How do we decide this?

The first question we have to ask is what factors do we have to consider to make this decision?  There are many, many factors that can go into this calculation.  For example, how good is your offense?  How good is the opponent's offense? How good is your kicker?  Do you have momentum on your side?  It would be impossible to evaluate the effect of each of these factors perfectly, but ultimately, they boil down into one of 4 factors:

1) What is the probability of making the field goal?
2) What is the probability of scoring a touchdown?
3) What is the probability of winning the game, if you go for a touchdown and miss?
4) What is the probability of winning the game if you attempt a field goal?

The coaches know (or SHOULD know) this information very, very well.  Even if they can't perfectly quantify it, their gut instinct is usually pretty good at figuring out these percentages.  However, if they're off, then the future calculations might be off as well.

The second part to this decision is how does the math shake out once we figure out what are the relevant factors. Even if one decision is "too risky", is the other decision the better choice, or is it even riskier?  While we won't be able to 100% accurately figure out the percentages, we can at least attempt to decide the best course of action, given the information we have.

Ultimately, we need to look at the chances of winning (or Win Probability, abbreviated WP) of each decision.

if WP(Field Goal) > WP(going for it), then the Packers should have kicked.
if WP(Field Goal) < WP(going for it), then the Packers should have went for it.
if WP(Field Goal) = WP(going for it), then it doesn't really matter either way.