Trusting your Kicker - Levels of Probability - CHI at MIN December 1, 2013

The Situation

In Sudden Death Overtime, Chicago has the ball and is driving after a Minnesota missed field goal (well, kicker Blair Walsh actually made one attempt, but was called back due to a stupid face mask penalty).  

On 2nd down and 7 at the Minnesota 29 yard line, coach Marc Trestman elects to have kicker Robbie Gould try a game winning 47 yard field goal.  Was this the right move?

On CBS, former Ravens coach and current color commentator Brian Billick agreed with Trestman, saying something to the effect of deciding what yard line your kicker can make the kick from, get it there, center the ball, then trust your kicker to make the kick.  Billick basically means the 30 yard line is a plenty good position to kick from, so instead of trying to get more yards, try to kick the FG now and now have anything bad happen.

Why would he say that?

Binary Thinking

Once the offense is in "field goal range," especially in a sudden death situation, most coaches go ultra conservative, making sure the ball isn't turned over.  These coaches decide what "field goal range" is for their kicker, then once they cross that line, worry more about keeping possession, centering the ball and the time on the clock rather than the distance to be kicked.  This is an example of binary thinking, where the kick can be made at one distance, but missed at another distance.  In reality, kickers make shorter kicks with more frequency than longer kicks (duh).  So, why are coaches thinking this way?

The reason coaches engaging in binary thinking decide to kick "too early", is because giving up possession on a potential game winning drive is a disaster.  They decide to turtle up and take the long field goal try, rather than trying to get closer.  Coaches in this situation also typically kick on 3rd down instead of 4th, just in case there's a bad snap or botched hold.

A broad analysis of field goals at the 45-49 yard distance shows a 68.6% chance of making the kick. Since 68.6 is more than 50%, surely it's the right move, right?

Given this number, why would any coach try to move the ball down the field further?  What are the benefits and costs of trying to move the ball down the field further, particularly in this sudden death situation?  

Third Quarter Decisions. One good, one bad

Week 13

Tennessee losing to Indianapolis 7-12 in the 3rd quarter 8:04 left to go.  They've been stuffed up to this point and are now at 4th and goal on the 1/2 yard line.  Play call is bootleg - pass, Touchdown and now they're up 14-12 (though as you know, I would have gone for two there)

NY Jets losing to Miami at home 0-13 in the 3rd quarter, 4:30 left to go.  4th down and 1.  Rex Ryan opts to kick the Field Goal here.  Sure, let's not have any faith in your offense.  Game over.

Edit: Miami goes down and scores a TD to make it 20-3 now.

Who Should be Calling Timeouts? A Simplified Bayes Theorem problem - PIT @ BAL, Thursday November 28, 2013

In an individual game, football is a zero-sum game.  Whatever is good for me is bad for my opponent, and whatever is bad for me is good for my opponent.  So, if I should call a timeout, my opponent definitely shouldn't, right?  What do the announcers think?

Down by 8 points with under 4 minutes to go, the Pittsburgh Steelers need to score a Touchdown and convert a 2 point conversion (2PAT) just to tie it up and potentially send the game to overtime.

The Situation

Pittsburgh is behind Baltimore 14-22 with under 2 minutes left to go in the game.  They need a touchdown and a 2PAT just to tie and potentially send the game to overtime.  Steelers QB Ben Roethlisberger threw an apparent touchdown pass to Heath Miller at 1:52 left, but the replay official rules he was down at the 1/2 yard line.  Announcer Cris Collinsworth remarks that it's a good thing the Steelers haven't scored yet since it allows them to burn some more time off the clock, presumably so if they score, the Ravens can't come back and win the game.  When he said that, the message board I was following at the time blew up and said how wrong he was in case the Steelers don't convert the 2PAT.

After a run for no gain, Baltimore takes its last timeout with 1:32 left.  Should they have taken that timeout?  If not, should the Steelers have done so with 2 timeouts remaining?

This leaves the Steelers with potentially conflicting goals.  If they do tie the game, they want to take as much time off the clock.  However, if they fail to do so, they want as much time on the clock as possible if they recover an onside kick to try to win.

The Factors

The most important, and obvious, factor is whether Pittsburgh can score or not.  However, this point is entirely moot.  At the 1 yard line, even with only 1:32 left, the clock is not the enemy.  Also, if the Steelers can't score in 3 more downs, it doesn't matter whether what's left on the clock since the Ravens will be able to run out the clock.

Another factor is the likelihood the Steelers will recover an obvious onside kick.  This number is less than 20% (to be generous).  If the Steelers don't recover the kick, then the clock doesn't matter.