Fortune Favors the Bold - Seattle vs. San Francisco - NFC Championship Game January 19, 2014

The Seattle Seahawks are going to Super Bowl XLVIII on the strength of a 23-17 victory over the visiting San Francisco 49ers.  The big play was the 4th and 7 touchdown pass from Russell Wilson to Jermaine Kearse from the 49ers 35 yard line.  Fortune favors the bold, and while some coaches might have opted to take the 53 yard field goal attempt or a punt to pin the 49ers deep in their own territory with plenty of time to get the ball back.  Coach Pete Carroll opted to go for it, and was rewarded.

Seahawks Jermaine Kearse catches this 35 yard TD pass from QB Russell Wilson

Though the decision paid off, we want to look at the mathematics behind the decision to figure out if it was a correct one or not.  Which option was the best in this situation?

The Situation and Options

At the start of the 4th quarter (13:52 remaining), the Seahawks trail 13-17.  The ball is at the 49ers 35 yard line and it's now 4th and 7.  The three options here are all seemingly reasonable:

1. Punting
2. Attempting a Field Goal
3. Going for it

In order to figure out which option is the best, we'll have to make some assumptions and use the Win Probability calculator from Advanced NFL Stats, to break down the expected outcome of each situation.

When 7 is not Greater than 2 - Dan Dierdorf - Indianapolis at New England, January 11, 2014

Dan Dierdorf is a football guy.  He played 13 seasons in the NFL, all for the St. Louis Cardinals.  He played all the positions on the offensive line, made the Pro Bowl 6 times and was enshrined in the Pro Football Hall of Fame in 1996.  Heck, he was even born in Canton, Ohio.  (For those of you unaware, it's the location of the Football Hall of Fame).  So it was especially puzzling to many football fans when Dierdorf basically said during last Saturday's Colts/Patriots game, that giving up 2 points is not as good as giving up 7 points or 3 points.

The Situation

On 4th down at their own 44 yard line, the Patriots line up to punt.  The snap sails over punter Ryan Allen's head, all the way back to the 2 yard line.  Allen eventually fumbles but the ball is batted out of the end zone for a safety, one of the more bizarre plays in the game.

Dierdorf, as the CBS color commentator (broadcasting his final game), suggested that it would have been better if Allen covered up the ball at the 2 yard line, preventing the Colts from scoring a safety that play.  Various pundits covering and watching the game blew up at that comment, saying it was one of the worst commentary they had ever heard.

The Two Worst Kicking Plays of the Playoffs - Indianapolis at New England - January 11, 2014

These were by far the two worst kicking decisions in the playoffs so far.  I'm not going to even do the math on these, but let's see how absurd these decisions are.  One decision was made while desperately behind, the other while comfortably ahead, and while neither determined the outcome of the game, they were both completely absurd.

The Game

The Indianapolis Colts faced the New England Patriots in the AFC Divisional round of the 2014 playoffs.  Due to the some early miscues, the Colts find themselves down in the game early, though only down 21-12 at halftime.  However, it's the 4th quarter decisions that leave me shaking my head.

Giving Up on the Season - Chuck Pagano

In the 4th quarter, the Colts are now down by 3 touchdowns, 22-43, and have the ball on their own 29 yard line with a 4th down and 1 (though it was probably less than 1 yard).  There is 10:30 left in the game.  The Patriots have been running the ball down your throat all game and will do so if they get the ball in an attempt to run out the clock. 

This is an obvious go-for-it situation here if you want to win a playoff game.  Instead, out comes the punt team.  It doesn't matter that field position is bad for the Colts, they're down by 3 touchdowns and desperate.  The Patriots would go on to take 8 more minutes off the clock, and the Colts would only have 1 more possession to close out the game.

When a team is that desperate in a playoff game and you send out the kicking unit, that qualifies as one of the worst kicking decisions in the playoffs, never mind the outcome.

Punting for 6 Yards - Bill Belichick

Later in the same quarter, the Patriots are running the clock down to under 3 minutes when they face a 4th and 10 at the Colts 26 yard line.  A field goal try would be around 44 yards here, a makable distance for kicker Stephen Gostowski.  Going for it would not be easy, but would give the Patriots a chance, however a slim one, to maintain the ball.  Plus, up 3 touchdowns, field position matters less.

Out comes the punt team, and Gostowski punts it into the end zone for a touchback.  Net gain in field position of 6 yards.  Since the Patriots go on to win this handily, nothing Belichick could do here would run their chances of victory, but it just leaves you scratching your head sometimes.

Hidden Plays - First Quarter Plays Set the Stage - Kansas City at Indianapolis, January 4th, 2013

2014 Wild Card Weekend was one for the ages.  Three games decided by a field goal, and the other one close enough to be in doubt until late (though there were plenty of questionable decisions by the losing coach).

The Chiefs/Colts game was crazy, with 89 points scored between the two teams and a 4 touchdown comeback (the 2nd greatest comeback in NFL playoff history, only to this '93 game between the Oilers and the Bills).  The Colt's 45-44 victory will be remembered for a long time in Indianapolis and around the league.

With the game being decided by a single point, one might think the game's most important decisions were made in the 2nd half as Indianapolis made their comeback.  Indeed, it was quite a monumental collapse by Kansas City.  Advanced NFL Stats even looked into the Chiefs' chance of winning if they simply knelt down on every play in the 2nd half.  However, there was a play early in the game that could have helped Kansas City get to an even further lead.

The Situation

With the game tied at 7, Kansas City faced a 4th-and-1 at the Colts' 1 yard line.  They got to this point from an Alex Smith to Dwayne Bowe 63 yard hookup, but only managed 1 yard on the first 3 downs.  Out comes the field goal unit and Ryan Succop kicks a 19 yard field goal to go up by 3.  Was it the right move?  Was it in fact the "safe" play here?

The Factors

Once again, we will look at the probabilities of success and failure for both a 4th down attempt and a field goal, but also look at what the expected outcome of the next Colts possession would be.  To do so, we will break it down into several parts:

1. Chiefs Kick a Field Goal

     a. What is the probability of success or failure?

     b. What is the expected outcome of the Colts' next drive depending on success or failure?

2. Chiefs Go for It on 4th Down

     a. What is the probability of success or failure?

     b. What is the expected outcome of the Colts' next drive depending on success or failure?

Since the game is still in the first half, the clock makes much less of a difference.  Clearly, if it was a tie game with only 2 seconds left to go, the Chief's would maximize win probability instead of trying to score the most points.

The Fine Line Between Genius and Insanity, Eric Weddle - San Diego vs. Kansas City, December 29, 2013

In week 17 of the 2013 season, the San Diego Chargers needed a win (or a tie) against the Kansas City Chiefs to advance to the playoffs.  KC kicker Ryan Succop missed a field goal attempt at the end of regulation to give the Chargers a chance to win it in overtime.  The most memorable play from that overtime period was when Charger safety Eric Weddle, as the personal protector on the punt team, took the snap from punt formation and rushed to gain a first down.  The Chargers go on to kick a field goal on this drive and hold on to win.


This was one of the most gutsy moves of the season, one that wasn't called by head coach Mike McCoy or special teams coach Kevin Spencer, but it was called by Weddle himself.  Luckily for them, it worked... or was it luck?

Should Weddle have audibled to the run?  What success rate did he need to make it worth it?

The Situation

In order to figure out whether or not it was the right move, we need to look at the situation as a whole. Some of the factors we have to look at include, the time left in the game, the current down and distance, and the win probabilities when either a) Converting 4th down b) Failing to convert 4th down and c) Punting.

From these numbers, we will be able to figure out what chance of success the Chargers will need on this play to attempt to gain the 1st down rather than punt.

The Clock

It's early in overtime, so the time on clock doesn't really factor in this case.  However, what does matter is that it's overtime.  If a play goes bad here, there's no turning back as Kansas City would have excellent field position for a win.  Many coaches take the opposite approach, refusing to be aggressive early in the game when a mistake can be overcome since there's a lot of time left in the game.

The Down and Distance

Though the graphics on the screen, and the official play-by-play, listed the play as a 4th and 2 from the 28 yard line, the ball was actually spotted on the 27 yard line, making it a 4th and 3 play, as shown below.

The famous fake punt play, actually 4th down and 3 yards to go

The fact that it's 4th and 3 will obviously make it more difficult to convert into a 1st down than 4th & 2, however running a fake gives the Chargers the element of surprise.

Almost Kicking Away a Chance at the Playoffs - Green Bay at Chicago - December 29, 2013

With the NFC North title on the line, the Green Bay Packers came back from a 28-20 deficit against the rival Chicago Bears.  Quarterback Aaron Rodgers, in his first game back from a fractured collarbone, drove the Packers from their own 13 yard line for the winning touchdown to receiver Randall Cobb, also back from injury.  A thrilling finish, one which I watched alongside many Packers fans in a bar in Wisconsin.  (Also at the same time, the Chargers were completing their own comeback, also for a playoff spot)

The Packers comeback almost didn't happen.   Coach Mike McCarthy almost prevented his own team from this comeback by sending out the punt team on a 4th-and-1 situation in their own half of the field. His offense had to talk him out of punting and go for it.  The linked nfl.com article calls it a gamble.  Many others in the bar thought it was an obvious play.

So was it a gamble, the right call, or could it go either way?

The Situation

Losing by 1 point, 28-27, with 4:41 to go in the game, the Packers face a 4th-and-1 at their own 22 yard line. This game is basically a playoff game, with the winner earning a spot in the playoffs as NFC North Champions, and the loser going home.  What should the Packers do in this spot?  To figure this out, we need to see what the Win Probability (WP) of each decision, to punt or to go for it.  We need to look at several factors to see what the right decision is.

The Factors

Coaches and fans can talk about "trusting their defense" or "pinning the other team back", but it basically comes down to several probabilities:

1. The probability of success on this 4th down and 1.
2. The probability of winning the game, given a conversion on this 4th and 1.
3. The probability of winning the game, given a punt to the Bears.

While we might not be completely accurate with these numbers, we can put in some estimates and see which decision gives the best chance of the Packers winning.  To get some ballpark figures, we will once again go to our friends at Advanced NFL Stats.

When NOT to score - Pittsburgh at Green Bay - December 22, 2013

Outside of sportsmanship purposes, is it ever right to NOT go for the most expected points?  Should there be a time when you tell your team to NOT score a touchdown?  If that's true, then wouldn't the defensive team WANT you to score a touchdown?  This scenario came up again in Week 16 of 2013 with the Pittsburgh Steelers visiting the Green Bay Packers at Lambeau Field.

The Situation

Pittsburgh and Green Bay are tied up, 31-31 in the 4th quarter.  On the first play after the 2 minute warning, Steelers safety Troy Polamalu forces a Matt Flynn fumble, recovered by Brett Keisel who returns it to the Packers' 17 yard line.  

The Steelers now have the ball with 1:51 left in the game.  The Packers have all 3 timeouts remaining.  Knowing that a score is highly likely, the Packers proceed to use their timeouts in an attempt to get more time on the clock for a comeback once the Steelers score.

The situation is a favorable one, as they force a 4th and 3 at the 10 yard line with 1:35 left in the game and the field goal team trots out to attempt a 28 yard field goal.  A field goal here would give the Packers over a minute left to tie or win the game and the Packers still have 1 timeout left.  However, an encroachment penalty gives the Steelers an automatic 1st down at the 5 yard line.

At this point, the question is: Should the Steelers intentionally not score until the last second, so they prevent any chance at a Packers comeback?  If this it true, then should the Packers intentionally allow the Steelers to score?  Remember, what's bad for my opponent must be good for me.

What should the Steelers do in this case?